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were entitled to assume the boat they
rented was free from defects. Accord-
ingly, the majority affirmed the district
court's holding that the Diplomat was
strictly liable for injuries to Mrs.
Amoroso resulting from defects in a
sailboat she rented from Atlantic. Thus,
the Florida Supreme Court extended the
application of strict liability to com-
mercial lease transactions, subject to
the limitations set forth in the opinion.
Dissenting justices question strict
liability
Justices McDonald and Overton con-
curred in part and dissented in part with
the majority's opinion. The justices con-
curred with the majority's decision in-
sofar as it held the Diplomat liable un-
der the theories of implied warranty of
fitness and negligence, but disagreed
with the application of strict liability to
the Diplomat. They contended that strict
liability should not apply to the Diplo-
mat because the sailboat rental business
was only an incidental part of the hotel's
business. Furthermore, the two justices
felt that the majority's application of
strict liability to the Diplomat was un-
necessary because the theories of im-
plied warranty of fitness and negligence
provide adequate protection to the pub-
lic in such cases.
-Christy Thouvenot
Mailing, not receipt,
determines refund
time limitations
In Rosser v. United States, 9 F.2d
1519 (1 lth Cir. 1993), the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the 11 th Circuit held that
the statute of limitations for a tax refund
claim expires two years from the mail-
ing of a disallowance notice. Reversing
the district court, the 11 th Circuit de-
clared the plain language of 26 U.S.C.
§6532(a)(1) to mean that the statute of
limitations for an income tax dispute
runs from the date a disallowance no-
tice is mailed, regardless of whether the
taxpayer actually receives such notice.
The court further maintained that a sec-
ond disallowance notice does not equi-
tably estop the Internal Revenue Ser-
vice (IRS) from asserting the statute of
limitations as a bar to a taxpayer's re-
covery.
Taxpayer Claims Refunds for
Charity Deductions
Robert G. Rosser's federal income
tax returns for the years 1979 through
1982 claimed charitable deductions for
art objects he donated to the Birming-
ham Museum of Art. The IRS disal-
lowed portions of those charitable de-
ductions and, therefore, found deficien-
cies in Rosser's tax liability for those
years. On April 5, 1985, Rosser paid his
deficiencies for 1979, 1980, and 1981.
On December 30, 1986, Rosser paid his
deficiencies for 1982 and 1983.
On March 18, 1987, Rosser filed
timely refund claims for 1980 and 1981.
On April 1, 1987, Rosser filed refund
requests for 1979, 1982, and 1983. On
January 5, 1988, the IRS responded to
Rosser's refund claims by sending to
him via certified mail notices of disal-
lowance for each of the years 1979
through 1983. Rosser denied receipt of
these notices and submitted an affidavit
attesting to his failure to receive them.
On December 30, 1988, Rosser
refiled his petitions for refunds for 1979
through 1983, contending that he had
not received the disallowance notices
from the IRS. The IRS responded by
mailing Rosser letters on January 17,
1989, which stated that it would look
into his 1982 and 1983 claims and an-
swer him "more fully in 60 days." On
January 23, 1989, the IRS issued Rosser
a notice of disallowance for 1979, 1980,
and 1981. The notice explained that his
claims were not timely filed as required
by 26 U.S.C. Section 6511 and advised
Rosser to contact the IRS with ques-
tions.
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On January 18, 1991, Rosser filed a
refund suit, arguing that the statute of
limitations did not begin to run upon
mailing of the initial notices of disal-
lowance on January 5, 1988. Rosser
argued that the Section 6511 statute of
limitations should not begin to run until
the taxpayer actually receives the no-
tice. Rosser contended that he reason-
ably relied on the January 17 and Janu-
ary 23, 1989, letters he received from
the IRS. In contrast, the IRS argued that
its letter mailed January 5, 1988, consti-
tuted adequate notice to begin the stat-
ute of limitations period, and that its
January 17, 1989, letter had no effect on
the limitations period.
The district court determined that
the statute of limitations did not bar
Rosser's suit, and pursuant to the par-
ties' stipulation as to the relevant amount
in taxes, entered judgment in Rosser's
favor.
Eleventh Circuit rejects taxpayer's
argument that notice receipt is
required
On appeal, the IRS contended that
both the plain language of Section
6532(a)(1) and congressional intent
conflict with Rosser's interpretation of
the statute. Thus, the 11 th Circuit first
examined the language of Section
6532(a)(1) which states as follows:
[n]o suit or proceeding.. for the
recovery of any internal revenue
tax... shall be begun... after the
expiration of two years from the
date of mailing by certified mail
or registered mail by the Secre-
tary to the taxpayer of a notice of
disallowance of the part of the
claim to which suit or proceeding
relates.
The court specifically noted that the
plain language of Section 6532(a)(1)
indicates that the statutory period be-
gins to run from the date of the mailing,
irrespective of the taxpayer's receipt of
the notice.
The 11 th Circuit next scrutinized the
legislative history of Section 6532(a)(1),
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and determined that the purpose of the
statute was to eliminate uncertainty
about when the statute of limitations
begins to run in cases such as Rosser's.
The court reasoned that if the limita-
tions period did not begin to run until
the taxpayer actually received notice,
the date triggering the limitations pe-
riod would remain an uncertainty, and
thus inconsistent with Section
6532(a)(1)'s purpose.
Finally, the court observed the prac-
tical considerations of the two-year stat-
ute of limitations under Section
6532(a)(1). Requiring the IRS to prove
a taxpayer's actual receipt of a disal-
lowance notice in order to trigger the
statute of limitations would be imprac-
tical. In addition, giving taxpayers the
opportunity to deny receipt of disallow-
ance notices would further delay the
statute of limitations period.
IRS could assert limitations statute
The 11th Circuit also held that the
district court erred in relying on cases
applying equitable estoppel against the
federal government. The district court
found that the actions the IRS took on
Rosser' s refiled claims tolled the statute
of limitations, and that the January 23,
1989, notice of disallowance the IRS
sent Rosser in response to his refiled
claims "stated on its face without reser-
vation or condition that plaintiff had
two years from [the date the second
notice was mailed] to file suit." The
1 1th Circuit, however, rejected the dis-
trict court's conclusion. The appellate
court posited that the January 23, 1989,
notice contained no language which
could have led Rosser to believe that he
had two years from the date of this
notice to file his claim, nor did this
notice contain any other language which
could have misled Rosser. Finally, the
11 th Circuit found no other bases for the
lower court to have employed the doc-
trine of equitable estoppel and, there-
fore, denied its application.
-Mona Dajani
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Texas Supreme
Court sets punitive
damages standards
In Transportation Insurance Co. v.
Moriel, 1994 WL 246568 (Tex.), the
Supreme Court of Texas clarified stan-
dards governing the imposition of puni-
tive damages awards in bad faith insur-
ance cases. The court held that insurers
will be liable for punitive damages only
if bad faith is accompanied by gross
negligence. In addition, the court ex-
plained what a plaintiff must show to
establish gross negligence, and an-
nounced new procedural standards for
punitive damages awards. The court
required courts to separate the determi-
nation of the amount of punitive dam-
ages from the other issues at trial, and
mandated that courts of appeals which
review the factual sufficiency of puni-
tive damages awards explain why the
evidence does or does not support the
award.
Insurance carrier delays paying bills
In March 1986, Juan Moriel was
injured when a stack of countertops fell
on him. He sustained fractures of the
wrist, pelvis, and ribs. Transportation
Insurance Company (Transportation),
Moriel' s employer's workers' compen-
sation carrier, paid his hospitalization
costs. Several days after his discharge
from the hospital, Moriel experienced
periods in which he was unable to move
his leg. He returned to the hospital for
testing. Six weeks following his acci-
dent, Moriel discovered he was impo-
tent. After tests conducted in El Paso
revealed no physical cause for the im-
potence and hormone therapy failed to
cure the problem, doctors advised Moriel
to undergo additional testing at a Hous-
ton hospital. Doctors in Houston found
Moriel's impotence to be at least par-
tially physical. They also recommended
that Moriel seek counseling for emo-
tional problems. Moriel did so and even-
tually was able to resume sexual rela-
tions with his wife.
Transportation delayed paying four
of Moriel' s bills. The company received
a $3,155 bill for Moriel's Houston tests
in November 1986. Although Trans-
portation had authorized the tests in
advance, it did not pay Moriel's bill for
more than two years, on the ground that
Moriel's impotence was unrelated to
his work injury. Second, Transporta-
tion delayed paying Moriel's $2,075
psychiatric counseling bill for more than
a year, claiming that it had never re-
ceived the psychiatrist's report. Third,
the company delayed paying a $382.25
bill for outpatient testing. It paid only
after the hospital filed a collection ac-
tion against Moriel. Finally, Transpor-
tation did not pay the bill for the El Paso
tests until after Moriel filed his lawsuit.
Evidence indicated, however, that be-
cause the El Paso company had mailed
the bill to the wrong address, Transpor-
tation did not receive it until after the
lawsuit commenced.
While he was undergoing testing and
treatment, Moriel filed a workers' com-
pensation claim against Transportation.
In July 1987, he received an award of
$30,022.77 from the Industrial Acci-
dent Board. When Transportation ap-
pealed, Moriel counterclaimed for ad-
ditional compensation, unpaid medical
bills, and bad faith claims practices. In
July 1988, Moriel and Transportation
settled the workers' compensation
claim.
At the trial on the bad faith claim, the
jury found that Transportation had no
reasonable basis to delay paying
Moriel's medical bills, and that Trans-
portation had "acted with heedless and
reckless disregard" of Moriel's rights.
The jury awarded Moriel $1,000 in ac-
tual damages, $100,000 in mental an-
guish damages, and $1 million in puni-
tive damages. The trial court entered
judgment on the verdict, and denied
Transportation's motions for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict, remittitur,
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